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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
G. V. MOSER,

I

Plaintiff-Appellant, )
vs.

T H E INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH: CARLYLE F.
No.
GRONNING, JOHN R. SCHONE, 1 11031
and STEPHEN lVI. HADLEY, its )
members; COMMERCIAL CARRIERS, INC., and FIREMAN'S
FUND,
Defendants-Respondents. i

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from An Order of The Industrial Commission of Utah
Denying Plaintiff's Petition For Re-hearing

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the Industrial
Commission of Utah denying plaintiff's claim for Workmen's Compensation.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a truck driver and has been for forty
( 40) or forty-five ( 45) years (Tr. 6). In 1965, he
leased a tractor or truck to Western Auto Transport
Company, and drove the tractor as an employee of
Western Auto until it was sold to Commercial Carriers, Inc., during or about 1960. When the Change of
Ownership was made, plaintiff and the other driver
employees retained their seniority status and continued
working substantially under the same lease arrangements as before. The particular Leased Equipment
Agreement under which plaintiff was working on September 9, 1965, is attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's
Petition for Writ of Review on file herein. The Agreement required that Commercial Carriers, Inc., have exclusive control over the tractor and that the tractor be
"operated only by employees of the Company selected
by the Company, paid by the Company, and carried on
the Company's payroll". The Agreement also provided
"that the Company shall be fully responsible to the
Shipper and the public for the direction, conduct, condition and operation of the leased equipment while
operated by the Company under this lease", and that
"the Company shall have the right to use said leased
motor vehicle equipment for any lawful purpose in
connection with its transportation business and shall
have full possession and control of said motor vehicle
equipment for the full period of this lease". The Agreement further provided that the Company would provide
at its sole expense whatever insurance it deemed neces2

sary and which was required by law and that "the Company shall also comply with the 'V orkmen' s Compensation Laws with respect to all employees engaged in
operation under this agreement . . . "
The business of the Company (Commercial Carriers, Inc.,) was and is to transport automobiles, which
it does by using tractors to pull trailers loaded with
automobiles or to pull trailers unloaded when they are
"dead headed" or moving empty to a point where they
can again be loaded for another haul. These trailers
are owned by Commercial Carriers, Inc. The Company
operates by virtue of holding certain Common Carrier
permits. The Appellant is not a licensed common carrier ( Tr. 9) .
Pursuant to said Leased Equipment Agreement and
others like it which preceded it, Appellant had for many
years driven the tractor pulling loads of cars both intrastate and interstate, and being gone from his home and
the Company's Salt Lake Terminal most of the time,
day and night,on the Company's business. He drives the
tractor, pulling the company's trailer both loaded and
empty whenever and wherever the Company directs.
Appellant's pay as an employee of the Company is
determined by the amount of revenue which the Company receives from its customers. This revenue, of
course, is limited to the times when the trailer is being
pulled with a load of cars. There is no revenue for the
Company or its employees when the trailer is moving
empty (Tr. 9).
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As a driver employee of the Company, appellant
received, as provided by the Agreement, 65% of the
revenue produced by the tractor and trailer that he
operated. But out of this 65%, the Company deducted
all operating and maintenance expense of the tractor
and trailer, expenses which under the Agreement, it was
his obligation to bear. From the Company's 35%, the
Company bore all insurance expense including '"' orkmen's Compensation, the expense of most of the road
permits, and the social security tax. The Company also
withheld and paid to the Internal Revenue Service and
the State Tax Commission the drivers' Federal and
State Income Withholding Tax.
Although the amount of a driver's wages is determined by the amount of revenue-paying miles he drives,
he is considered to be on the job the moment he steps
on the truck or while checking the equipment and starting it (Tr. 8). According to I.C.C. regulations this
time is included in the driver's logging or on-duty time,
and is included in figuring the maximum hours he is
permitted to drive, namely, seventy hours in any eight
consecutive days and nights (Tr. 7 and 8), and this
rule a pp lied to the time Moser spent trying to get the
truck started on the morning of September 9, 1965,
when he was injured (Tr. 8). Appellant's uncontroverted testimony in this respect as elicited from Moser
by respondents' representative at the hearing as appears
on pp. 7-8 of the transcript is confirmed by the Safety
Regulations of the I.C.C., which provide as follows:
"Section 195.2 DEFINITIONS - As used
4

in this part, the following words and terms are
construed to mean:
(a) On-duty time. * * * The term "On-duty
time" shall include: * * *

( 4) All time, other than driving time, in or
motor_ vehicle except time spent resting
m a sleeper berth as defined in Section 195.2 (g).
~pon ~my

* * * *

( 7) All time repairing, obtaining assistance,
or remaining in attendance upon a disabled vehicle; * * * ."

On September 8, 1965, Appellant returned to Salt
Lake from Vernal, Utah, where he had delivered a
trailer load of cars. He arrived at Salt Lake 11 :00
or 12 :00 o'clock at night, signed in at the yard, went to
his home in Bountiful, and slept the balance of the
night, planning to return to the yard the next morning
(Tr. 7). He left the tractor and trailer at a lot near
his home in Bountiful while he slept (Tr. 6). Knowing
that he was to work the next morning (Tr. 7), he left
his home with his suitcase on his way to work, went
to the lot where the truck and trailer unit was parked,
and tried to start the truck, but it wouldn't start (Tr.
3). After working on it awhile, he went back to his home
and called his employer on the 'phone. He talked with
Norman C. Gordon, the Company's terminal manager
in Salt Lake City (Tr. 10), and told him he couldn't
get the truck started (Tr. 9) . As related by Moser,
Norman told him "to check it out for ignition and gas
and see what was wrong if I could, and if I couldn't do
it why he'd send help out to me" (Tr. 3).
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Inasmuch as the battery was low. he took his wife
in his car to the truck so that she could help him get
started \Tr. 31. 'Yhat happend then, as stated by
)loser. follows: ··1 jumped cables that goes to the
truck and she turned it over and I checked the ignition.
I had spark. and I checked for gas and I w-asn·t getting
any gas. so I drained out a little out of the truck and
pourt:>d it in the carburetor. and she starie<l it. but it
stopped. I thought. well. Ill pour a little more in and
if it starts then Ill keep dribbling a little iIL lYbch.
you shouldn't dt.1. I guess.
··_\nyhow. it back.tired th3t time. :ind I ~as s:anding up on the bumper leaning Qver. and I .~wnped bsc~
and when I did. I had this can oi g:b :::..!:d ilirew ~:
all '-wer m,. ri~-rht side. and :: inm~:eiv. c;:..-..~.zr:.:
- ::ne
l)Il ~. 'Yell. my w:ie. ~d my s::.5tc:-r-IL-~" ~pp-.:r..eii
to be tlk-ttkll...1. Ii they b.'1dn.t bttr:. I --:·:.hd ;...~.-::- ~-~::-:
up. Bn-ause llt.'lx'-l~- else '"-~5 L'~:-sc- e.::.:·...:.~ :.- i~ :!.:C:.,Y·
thin~.
T!k-Y
.....
. tiniliY. .....~1: De ri.n:- ·::..:.:. F'~~i :::y- ~ •::-::--~ ;·,
'-'tf. and ~1 t the ~ ~'"J.:. ~2 ::-.c-~ I _E:"·...:.: -·-r:: ~--:the tru~k afta ±~n- I~. i .
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BY THE REC 0 RD AXD
THEHEFORE A.RBITRARY AXD CAPRICIUCS UR ARE :'\OT LEGALLY SIGXIFICAXT
CXDEH THE CIRCC)IS'L\XCES OF THIS
CASE.
Sl~PPOR TED

There are two statements in the Commission's
Onler which are directly contrary to the only fi-idence
it1 t.he record. The first is the finding that .......\.pplic:ant
\ms a iicensed common carrier.' The second is the finding that ··at the time or the explosion applicant was
uot on his way to the terminal". The facts are that applicant was not a licenseci common carrier. His employer
\\ <h .....~nd applicant was on his way to the terminal at
the time of the "explosion ... 'Ye shall now renew the
record on these matters.
The fact that Commercial Carriers, Inc., was the
Lcen-,ed Common Carrier and not )fr. )loser is stated
•:.11 page 9 of the Transcript as follows:
"The Referee: . .-Ue you a certitied carrer in
interstate commerce r
. ..\.nswer: _\ C OilllllOil Carrier?
The Referee: Yes.
The 'Yitness: Tht:JI are, Yes.
The Referee: . ..\. C•)IlllllOil Carrier?
The \Yitness: Yes. The_u Art' all o•er the
Cnited States ... , Our emphasis·.
The fore~·l'•ing is fr;:- C'IUY ET:dence as to "ho had
_ Lc:ense. The ~ms,.-er is .;imply th~1t Colll.illerci:il Car: ~r-. Inc.. bad a Cl'lllli.Ln c~uric-r license. rwt )fr.
~fr:.ser.

As to the other erroneous finding of fact which
the Commission makes, the only evidence as to where
.Mr. Moser was going when he was injured is as follows:
On page 2 of the transcript after referring to the
morning of September 9, Mr. ~loser states: "I left
my home with my suitcase, and I went down to where
my truck was parked, ready to go to work." 'Vhen he
coudn't get the truck started, he called his employer,
who then gave him instructions as to what to do to
get it started.
On page 6 of the Transcript, during Mr. Robertson's cross examination of l\ilr. Moser, we read:
Question: Do you report to work ever morning?
Answer: Yes, whenever I'm in. You know, if
I'm home. When I finish a trip, I report in the
next morning. That is what I was doing.
Question: When had you made your last trip?
Answer: I got in-well, I signed in down to
the yard. I think it was right around midnight.
I had come in from Vernal. I made a trip to
Vernal, and it was 11 :00 or 12 :00 o'clock at night
and I went home, slept all night, and was going
down the next rnorning ." (Our emphasis) .
Again on pp. 7-8, we read (Moser still being crossexamined by Robertson:
Question: On the morning of the accident, had
you called to see if you were to work that day?
Answer: vVell, I knew I was to work.
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Question: \Vhen did you find that out?
Answer: I cpuld tell when I signed in how
many was ahead of me and I knew I'd get out.
Question: \Vhat would be the usual course in
your reporting?
Answer: Well, at that time, we had a 9:00 dispatcher, who was supposed to be down there at
9 :00, and he set up whatever loads he had drivers
in for. And the first one in on the list would take
his load, see. So that is why I was going down
there at 9 :00 and that is why at five minutes to
9 :00 . . . when I couldn't get my truck started
... I called him and told him I couldn't start it.
Because I couldn't get there at 9:00 o'clock, see
The foregoing evidence establishes conclusively
that when Appellant left his home that morning he
was, in fact, on his way to the Terminal and the only
thing that prevented his accomplishing that objective
was the accident he suffered while trying to get the
motor started. Instead of going to the Terminal as he
intended he went to the hospital (Tr. 4) because of
the accident.
All of the findings of fact upon which the Commission bases its conclusions of law with respect to
Appellant's not being an empJoyee when the accident
occurred-at least as such facts appear in the Orderareas follows:
I. "At the time of the explosion Applicant was
not on his way to the terminal."

2. "Applicant was a licensed common carrier."
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3. "He was not paid time or mileage for the
thirteen miles from his home to the terminal."
4. "Applicant did receive wages but the wages

were paid because the I.C.C. required it. However, the wages were deducted from the 65% of
the freight charges."
We have shown from the record that the first two
findings of fact are in error, completely without foundation of any evidence, and contrary to the evidence. If
these findings were intended to support the conclusions
of law then the Order necessarily is arbitrary and capricious, being without factual foundation, and is in error
for these reasons alone.
As to the last two findings about wages we observe
that in determining whether Appellant wa~ injured "in
the course of his employment" the absence of wages
at the time of injury is not an important factor by the
weight of authority. In Horovitz, Current Trends In
Workmen's Compensation, we read at pages 770-771:
"The overwhelmil}g weight of authority regards the absence of wages as irrelevant on the
issue of arising in the course of the employment.
While payment of wages for the period in question strengthens the fact that the injury occurred
in the course of the employment, as paid time
· is rarely other than 'in the course of' the employment, the absence of payment is usually of little;
if any, importance. In short, 'in the course of
is not limited to the time for which wages are
paid."
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POINT II.
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DENYING
APPELLANT'S CLAIM ON THE GROUND
TIIAT APPELLANT WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IS BASED UPON LEGAL CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Commisson in its Order observes that the
"applicant did sustain an injury by accident. The only
issue is whether it was in the course of his employment
at the time of the accident." In solving this issue the
Commission makes the findings of fact referred to
above in Point I and then gives what may be identified
as its conclusions of law as follows:
I. "His work began when he reached the terminal and not when he left home."
2. "Applicant was not an employee of the
Commercial Carriers, Inc., within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, when the
accident occurred."
Based on these legal conclusions, the Commission entered its Order denying the claim.

It would thus appear from the Commission's view
of the issue involved and from its findings of fact and
conclusions of law that the Commission has considered
this case as one in which the claimant fails as an employee in the course of his employment because he, at
the time of the accident, had not yet reported for work.
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It is our position that Appellant was an employee
of Commercial Carriers, Inc., and in the course of hi-,
employment
at the time of the accident for the followina0
•
reasons:
1. He had left his home and was on his way to the

Terminal to do his employer's work.
2. He was trying to start the truck when the acci-

dent occurred.
3. He was following his employer's specific in-

structions as to how to try to get the engme started
when the accident occurred.
4. He was working on the engine of the true~

which, under a lease agreement. belonged to and wa~
under the exclusi...-e control of his employer. Also. the
Company·s trailer was attached to the truck.
5. The truck and trailer not onh- were in the con-

trol. use, possession or ownership of the employer. but
they were in constant use by the appellant exclusin·l~
operated by appellant for his employer. and essential
in all the work appellant 'ms doing for the emplo>·er.

r

nder the ~-\..greement the truck was to be operated only by an employee of the Company selected
by the Company: and ~-\.. ppellant was the employee
selected by the Company to operate it: and at the time
of the accident he w~1s in the process of trying to operate
it in furtherance of the Company·s business.
6.

"-e belieH' thi~ case has an element creating an
.. in the CL•nrse llf hi.; emplt•~·ment'· situatiL•ll independent
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of elements which would place it in the category of
an exception to the "going and coming" to work rule.
That element is the fact that when Appellant was injured he was following specific instructions of his employer as to what to do to try to get the engine started.
If this element were not sufficient by itself to place
Appellant "in the course of his employment," it certainly adds to all the factors which bring this case
within the exceptions to the "going and coming" rule.
A brief statement of the rule and the need for a
developing of exceptions thereto is well stated in
OBrien ·cs. First Camden National Bank and Trust
Company, 37 N.J. 158, 179 A2d 740 (1940):
"In the administration of workmen's compensation laws, a doctrine grew up known as the
'going and coming' rule. In the jurisdictions
where adopted, it signified that until an employee
came on the employer's premises he was not in
the course of employment; also that at the end
of the work period on leaving the premises he
stepped out of the course of employment. In
short, injuries recefred en route to and from
work were said to be non-compensable ... The
sweeping generality of the rule inevitably
spa,vned exceptions ... The various exceptions
adopted have in turn brought back into sha.rper
focus the basic statutory test of compensab1hty,
that is, whether under the facts and circumstances of the particular situation the injury
arose out of and in the course of the employment.
Too easv reference to the subordinate going and
coming ·precept manifestly pointed in the direction of injustice in particubr fact complexes.

13

Application of this basic test to the facts in a
given case must be engaged in with an appreciation of the beneficient social purpose of workmen's compensation. 'Vhen so applied, if it can
be said reasonably that the employee is servina
an incidental interest of his employer at the tim~
of injury, the right to compensation exists."
Recently, this court had occasion to express its
approval of a view in harmony with the foregoing in
the case of Bailey vs. Utah State Industrial Cornmission, 16 Utah 2d 208, 398 P.2d 545. This case was an
appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission
denying applicant an award for the death of Bailey.
Prior to his death the deceased owned and operated a
service station in Lehi and was injured as a sole proprietor. He was thus employer and employee. The applicant usually left his home from 5 :00 A.M. to 5 :30
A.1\11. and drove, in his station wagon, to the service
station which he customarily opened at 6 :00 A.M. On
September 23, 1963, at approximately 5 :45 A ..M.,
Bailey was killed in a one-car (his station wagon)
accident at a point less than a mile from his business
and on the highway leading thereto.
The commission, in denying the claim, determined
that the accident did not occur in the course of employment, because the deceased was not on a special mission
but was merely on his way to his place of employment.
In reversing the Commission, the Court said:
"There are cases and authority to the effect
that, when an employee is required by his em-
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plo:fer to bring his own vehicle to the place of
busmess for use there, the employee is covered
while going to and from work in the vehicle.
"It is undisputed that the station wagon involved was used by the deceased in his business
and somewhat necessary thereto. He used it for
emergency calls at all hours, carried in it some
necessary tools and implements to service or
repair customers' automobiles and permitted
customers to use it while their cars were being
serviced at hi.s station. * * *
"Under the uncontradicted evidence, it appears that the station wagon * * * was an instrumentality of decedent's business and was
subject to that use. It was the deceased's regular
and definite duty to take the vehicle in the mornings to the station for its use in the business. In
doing so, he was performing for his employer
(himself) a substantial service required by his
employment (business) at the place and in the
manner so required. Under these circumstances,
we hold that the deceased sustained his fatal injuries in an accident that occurred in the course
of his employment."
Surely, if Bailey's death was compensable because
he was driving to work in his own car which was used
in his business for emergency calls at all hours, Appellant's injuries should be compensable inasmuch as he
was trying to start his employer's truck and trailer unit
so he could go to work and use it constantly in the
employers' business.
A case very much in point is Barak vs. H. E.
T-V csterman Lumber Company, 239 Minn. 327, 58 N.W.
2d 567 ( 1953) . In this case, a lumberyard manager died
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from carbon monoxide poisoning while attempting to
start his own automobile at his home preparatory to
going to work. He was expected to have his car at his
place of employment to make deliveries and inspections. The employer paid his mileage when he was on
company business, but did not pay mileage for the trip
to and from work. The death was held to be compensable. The Court said:
"In our opinion, the testimony was sufficiently
positive and unimpeached to justify a finding
that decedent had to have his car in connection
with his business. If so, it follows that he had
to get it started. There appears to be sufficient
evidence here to indicate that he was working
on the car, or was attempting to get it started
when the fatal accident occurred. * * *
"In view of our holding that the record convinces us that as a matter of law decedent used
or was expected to use his car almost daily in
connection with his employment, we must conclude under the facts and circumstances here
that as a practical matter, part of his services
in connection with his employment, was to take
his car with him to the lumber yard in order to
have it ready when needed, rather than then having to go back home and get it each time. It is
our opinion that such service required his prese.nce in his garage to start his car at the time of
the injury and that his accidental death arose
out of and in the course of his employment."
This case is cited with approval in Larson's T¥ orkmen's Compensation Law. In paragraph 17.50 of this
authority we read:
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"Closely. anal~go.us to the employer's conveyance rule m prmc1ple is the holding that the
~ourse of e~ployment embraces the trip to and
from. work if t.he employee as part of his job is
reqmred to brmg with him his own car, truck,
or motorcycle. The same theory applies; the
obligations of the job reach out beyond the premises, make the vehicle a mandatory part of the
employment environment, and compel the employee to submit to the hazards associated with
private motor travel, which otherwise he would
have the option of avoiding. Since this is the
theory, it is immaterial whether the employee is
compensated for the expenses of the trip."
In Horovitz, Current Trends in Workmen's Compensation, pages 667-682, we read:
"The narrow rule that a worker is not in the
course of his employment until he crosses the
employment threshold is itself subject to many
exceptions. Off-premise injuries to or from work,
in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable * * * (6) where the employee is required
to bring his automobile to his place of business
for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are
equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances."
In the case of K no>wles vs. Nor th Dakota Workmen's Comperu~ation Bureau (1925) 52 N.D. 563, 203
N.VV. 89.5, plaintiff was employed as a mechanic and
truck driver. He had borrowed a truck from his employer for his personal use on a Sunday. After using
the truck, he took it back to his employer's garage, but
it was locked, and a foreman told the plaintiff to take
the truck home and bring it to the garage the following
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morning. In attempting to crank the truck at his home
the next morning, he was injured. The court held that
the injury sustained was in the course of his employment. Said the Court:
"YVhen he was cran~ing the truck on :Monday
morning, preparatory to delivering it at the
shops, he had ceased to be about his own business, and was executing the orders of his master
in the ordinary and actual course of his employment, and pursuant to the contract of service
* * *. In the circumstances, regardless of where
the truck happened to be, it was the duty of the
plaintiff as a servant to bring it to the shops,
not because he had borrowed it for his own use
the day before, but because he was ordered to do
so by his master in connection with the usual
course of duty. He was on the business of his
employer."
All of these cases and authorities support the validity of Appellant's claim. They also support our view
that the Commission has drawn conclusions of law ·which
are neither supported by the actual facts of the record,
nor the law of the State of Utah as set forth recently
by this Court, nor by the text book authorities, nor by
the authority of the cases generally.

CONCLUSION
Appellant is entitled to be compensated for his
injuries because at the time of his accident, Appellant
was an employee of Commercial Carriers, Inc., and
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acting in the course of his employment. The employment agreement under which he worked as an employee
and the uncontroverted facts as they appear in the
transcript record of the hearing show that Appellant
at the time of his accident had left his home and was
on his way to the employer's Terminal to do his employer's work. He was engaged in an effort to start his
employer's truck in the manner directed by his employer, and the truck and trailer as a unit was operated
by Appellant exclusively and full time in his employer's
business.
The Commission in denying Appellant's claim has
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and contrary to law
as the law should be applied to the facts of this case.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PARK SlWOOT
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant
847 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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